The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response *
Eric B. Budish, Peter Cramton, John J. Shim
The Quarterly Journal of Economics OATop-listed
Faculty
Peter Cramton is Professor of Economics Emeritus at the University of Maryland. Since 1983, he has conducted research on auction theory and practice. This research appears in leading economics journals. The focus is the design of auction-based markets. Applications include communications, electricity, and financial markets. On the practical side, he is an advisor and chief economist to several companies. From 2015-2021, he was an independent director on the board of the Electric Reliability Council of Texas. Since 1993, he has advised 15 governments and 44 bidders in spectrum auctions. He is a co-inventor of the spectrum auction design used in Canada, Australia, and many European countries to auction spectrum. Since 2001, he has played a lead role in the design and implementation of electricity and gas auctions in North America, South America, and Europe. He has advised on the design of carbon auctions in Europe, Australia, and the United Sates, including conducting the world’s first greenhouse-gas auction held in the UK in 2002. He has led the development of innovative auctions in new applications, such as auctions for airport slots, wind rights, diamonds, medical equipment, and Internet top-level domains. He received his B.S. in Engineering from Cornell University in 1980 and his Ph.D. in Business from Stanford University in 1984.
International Research Fellow · Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics
Eric B. Budish, Peter Cramton, John J. Shim
The Quarterly Journal of Economics OATop-listed
Larry Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Marek Pycia, Marzena J. Rostek, Marek Weretka
The Review of Economic StudiesTop-listed